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Consumers and the Brain Drain: 
Product Design and the Gains from Emigration
*
 
We consider the welfare effects of skilled worker emigration in a context where skilled labor 
plays a role in product design. We show such emigration can benefit the residents left 
behind, even when consumers’ tastes exhibit a form of home bias. This is because 
emigration improves the design of goods designed by skilled emigrants but consumed in the 
sending country. In contrast to existing models of beneficial brain drain, our results do not 
require agglomeration economies, education-related externalities, remittances, return 
migration, or an emigration “lottery”. Instead, they are driven purely by differences in market 
size that induce skilled emigrants to design better products abroad than at home. 
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1. Introduction.  
 
Will a “brain drain” from a small or low-wage economy hurt or help residents 
remaining behind?  The earliest economics literature on this question (e.g. Berry and Soligo 
1969, Bhagwati and Hamada 1974) showed that remaining residents may be harmed by 
diminished opportunities to trade with differently-endowed agents.  More recent contributions 
have identified a number of factors that could give rise to beneficial brain drain (BBD).  
These include increased incentives to acquire education in the sending country (Mountford 
1997), remittances (e.g. Ozden and Schiff 2006), and added discipline on the sending 
country’s tax authorities (Bucovetsky 2003).  
 
  In this paper we study another possible source of beneficial brain drain: the direct 
benefit to sending-country consumers that occurs when its brains move to an environment 
where they produce higher-quality goods.  More specifically, we distinguish between two 
aspects of production—design and replication—and argue that skilled labor plays an 
important role in the former.  Because improved design increases the value of every unit of a 
product distributed to consumers, its benefits accrue to all of its consumers, regardless of 
where they live.  Thus sending-country consumers can gain by exporting their skilled workers 
if those workers design better products abroad than they would have had they stayed home.   
 
  Obvious examples of the effect we model might be scientists sent to a U.S. laboratory, 
actors sent to Hollywood, and programmers sent to Silicon Valley.  If such individuals invent 
drugs, make movies, or write software of superior quality to what they would have produced 
in their home countries, then—because this higher quality applies to units of the good 
consumed in the home country as well—, the remaining residents of those countries may be 
better off.  Slightly less obvious, but probably more important examples include contributions 
made by foreign-born managers and engineers to the quality of any good or service that is 
designed in the U.S. and consumed abroad.
1  Of course, the level of marginal replication 
costs, the amount of home bias in tastes, and the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
in the sending and receiving countries will affect the magnitude of these gains in consumer 
welfare.  We study these effects in this paper as well.  
 
What factors might induce a sending country’s brains to design higher-quality goods 
when employed abroad?  While we can think of several—including agglomeration economies 
and a stronger IPR environment—in order to illustrate the distinct nature of the causal 
mechanisms studied here, our baseline model assumes identical production costs and full 
IPRs in both the sending and receiving countries.  The welfare gains from brain drain come 
instead from market size and home-bias effects: if the foreign market is sufficiently larger 
than the sending country’s, and if the product doesn’t lose too much “in translation,” the extra 
incentives to raise quality created by this larger market mean the (remaining residents of) the 
home country are better off allowing their skilled workers to emigrate.   
 
 
                                                 
1 It is irrelevant to our basic argument whether the good is manufactured (i.e. replicated) in the immigrant-
sending or receiving country.  In fact the gains to brain drain are enhanced when emigration creates 
manufacturing jobs in the migrant-sending country based on superior designs created by its expatriates.     2
 
2. Existing Literature 
 
As noted, the earliest economics literature on the “brain drain” (e.g. Berry and Soligo 
1969), and indeed on international factor mobility in general (e.g. Jones, Coelho and Easton 
1986), focused on induced changes in domestic factor prices and producer surplus in an 
undistorted “sending” economy.  Although exceptions exist (for example the two-good, two-
factor small open economy model in which factor rewards are independent of factor 
endowments, and the case of large countries whose terms of trade are advantageously 
affected by a factor outflow), in most of these models the reduction in opportunities to trade 
with differently-endowed agents makes remaining residents worse off after an outflow of 
skilled labor.
2   
 
Since then, economists have identified a number of factors that accentuate the harm 
associated with a “brain drain”.  One such factor is a fiscal externality:  in the presence of 
publicly-subsidized education and progressive taxation, the exodus of highly educated 
workers imposes a net fiscal loss on the sending country’s remaining residents (Bhagwati and 
Hamada 1974).  Also, in an endogenous growth context, some authors have argued that an 
outflow of educated workers can inflict substantial long run harm by reducing a country’s 
growth rate (Miyagiwa 1991, Wong and Yip 1999).
3   
 
Over the same time period, however, the literature has identified a number of factors 
working in the opposite direction, generating what is sometimes referred to as “beneficial 
brain drain” (BBD).  Probably the oldest such argument is the notion that emigration provides 
a social “safety valve” for unemployed skilled workers in less developed countries (see for 
example the discussion in Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975).  Two additional factors—by no 
means confined to skilled workers—are emigrants’ cash remittances to the home country (e.g. 
Ozden and Schiff 2006), and the return migration of “brains” who have acquired new skills 
abroad (possibly at foreign taxpayers’ expense).
4  Less obviously, Stark, Helmenstein and 
Prskawetz (1997, 1998) have argued that the possibility of emigrating and earning a higher 
wage can raise incentives to acquire education in less-developed sending countries.  If this 
effect is strong enough relative to the actual outflow of educated workers, the “sending” 
country’s stock of skilled workers can of course rise.  Extending this “emigration lottery” 
reasoning to an endogenous growth framework, Mountford (1997) has shown that the 
temporary possibility of skilled-worker emigration can “jump-start” an economy out of a 
poverty trap.   
 
  Most recently, Bucovetsky (2003) and Haupt and Janeba (2004) have considered the 
discipline that skilled emigration could impose on tax authorities in skilled-worker “sending” 
countries:  human capital, once acquired, is sunk and therefore vulnerable to over-taxation by 
governments with limited commitment power.  By constraining governments’ abilities to tax 
                                                 
2 Despite its age, the argument still figures prominently in contemporary policy discussions about international 
labor mobility (see for example Borjas 1995).  Of course, nothing in the argument is specific to skilled labor:  it 
pertains to any non-infinitesimal factor outflow that does not mirror the nation’s factor endowment mix exactly.   
3 Introducing a skilled worker outflow into more traditional growth models (where growth occurs purely via 
either human or physical capital accumulation) has less dramatic negative long run effects (see, e.g. Rodriguez 
1975).  
4 According to DeVoretz (2005), it is precisely this prospect of return migration that led China to relax its exit 
requirements in the early 1990s. 
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human capital, the possibility of brain drain can induce those governments to act in their 
country’s own long run interests, thus raising the long term level of human capital investment 
and per-capita income.   
 
 
3. The Model  
 
As noted, our vision of the production process for any good distinguishes two aspects:  
design and replication.  The former determines a product’s features, or the appeal to 
consumers of a single unit of the good, which we refer to as quality.  The second involves 
replicating the prototype and distributing copies to consumers.  While it seems natural to us 
that skilled workers are employed relatively intensively in the design phase rather than the 
production phase, this is not essential to our main result. To illustrate our main result most 
simply, our base-case model focuses on a single skilled worker at risk of emigration, whose 
only activity is product design.
5  This “designer”, scientist, artist, or “brain” produces a 
prototype good; examples of a prototype might be a musical recording, an insight into the 
laws of physics, or a malaria vaccine.  To focus on essentials, our base case model assumes 
(as in Rosen 1981) that the prototype can be replicated costlessly.  We briefly consider the 
effects of non-zero replication costs in Section 5.   
 
Market willingness to pay for a single copy of the good depends on two product 
attributes: quality, ρ, and relevance,  t; we discuss each attribute below.  We assume 
individual inverse demand for a reproduction is given by tρp(q) where p(q) is a decreasing 
function of quantity consumed per capita, q.  We can interpret p(q) as base inverse demand, 







) ( − ≡ ε as the elasticity of base demand.  An interior solution to the profit 
maximization problem requires ε to be decreasing in q, which we assume throughout the 
remainder of the paper.   
 
The variable ρ captures the intrinsic quality of a good; for example, if the good is a 
treatment for influenza, ρ may index the speed with which the treatment reduces flu 
symptoms. We draw a distinction between quality and applicability, or relevance: ever since 
Armington (1969), several economists (e.g. Trefler 1995) have argued that consumers may 
inherently prefer locally produced goods.
6  In the current paper we operationalize home bias 
via an iceberg “translation” cost 1-τ; we can think of τ as the fraction of a good’s value that 
survives translation to a foreign market.  Recalling terminology introduced above, let t
ij 
                                                 
5 The remaining residents of the designer’s home country can be thought of either as unskilled workers who 
produce a numeraire good at constant unit cost, or as other designers who produce prototypes that do not 
compete with the potential migrant’s prototype.  Either way, the incomes of these remaining residents will not be  
affected by whether the migrant stays or leaves, which allows us to focus on the new (consumption-related) 
aspects of our model here.  Modelling the migration of multiple noncompeting brains would of course be 
straightforward; modelling competition between migrating and local brains (in both the sending and receiving 
countries) would require a differentiated products framework with endogenous quality choice.  We have also 
studied a version of the model in which unskilled workers derive their incomes by making copies of prototypes.  
None of these changes affect the basic point of our paper, so we have elected to illustrate that point in the 
simplest possible way.   
6 Empirical studies tend to find strong evidence of home bias in consumption.  For example, Whalley and Xin 
(2006) show home bias can account for over 90% of the measured border effect in US-Canada trade. 
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measure the relevance to consumers in market i of a good developed in market j; with iceberg 
translation costs, t
SR=t
RS = τ   [0,1] while  t ∈
SS=t
RR=1. One way to interpret τρ is as the net 
premium for imported, or translated, goods.  We treat τ as a parameter outside the designer’s 
and government’s control, however we acknowledge that τ will vary with the type of good 
considered: for instrumental music τ may be near unity; the τ associated with comedy is often 
remarked to be close to zero.
7   
 
  If emigration is legal, the designer faces a two-stage problem.  First she must decide 
where to live and work, and second she must decide what quality prototype to produce and 
how to price it to each market. As usual, we begin with the second stage.   
 
3. 1 Stage Two:  Profit Maximization 
 
We simplify the world into two countries: Source (S) and Recipient (R).  Let N
i be the 
number of consumers in country i∈{S,R}.  Define π
i  = maxq p
i(q)q as the designer’s 
maximized per capita base profits from market i, and q
i = argmaxq p
i(q)q as her optimal per 
capita deliveries to this market.
8  Note that our inverse demand functions are indexed by 
country (i); this allows per-capita income differences to enter our model with higher income 
assumed to shift the inverse demand curve upwards.  In this section we assume that both 
Source and Recipient provide full legal protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs).  Thus 
the designer is an uncontested monopolist in both markets, and will choose q
i such that ε=1 in 
each market. Using these definitions, we can rewrite the designer’s total profits from market i 
when residing in country j as N
it
ijρπ
i.  Further, the designer can treat π
S and π
R as parameters 
when solving her investment and location problems.  
 
Improving the quality of the prototype comes at a price.  The brain may hire 
complementary inputs (a scientist outfitting a better lab, or an industrial engineer hiring more 
qualified colleagues and assistants), acquire additional human capital (voice lessons for an 
opera singer, a post doc for a biologist or M.B.A. for a manager), or simply put in more effort 
(work more intensely or for longer hours).  We will refer to any such actions as investments. 
Let c(ρ) measure the total cost of producing a prototype of quality ρ.  To make things simple 
we assume c(ρ)= Ψ
Ψ + 1
ρ ; convexity requires Ψ>0.  
 




i as effective market size in country i. When the designer remains in Recipient 
her effective global market size is M
R=X
R+τX




Thus when the designer lives in country j she chooses ρ to  
 
maxρ  ρM 
j- c(ρ). 
 
The cost function’s convexity ensures the second order conditions for an interior 
maximum hold; rearranging the first order condition M
j = c’(ρ) yields 
                                                 
7 Importantly, the home bias in our paper refers to the designer’s current location, not his/her country of birth; 
thus we assume that, for example, Indian consumers treat goods produced by Indian expatriates in the United 
States similarly to goods produced by other Americans.  In part, this is based on a prevalent notion in the 
business literature that close contact (in our case living in the same country and culture) with consumers is 
essential to producing innovations that customers like (see for example Ulwick 2002).  
8 Because ε is decreasing in q, base profits p
i(q)q are locally concave at q
i and q
i is unique. 



















ξ .  Differentiating gives dρ/dM
j=Ψρ/M
j>0, indicating quality is 
increasing in market size.  This is as one would expect: when the designer can collect a 
quality price premium from more consumers, she invests in creating a higher quality product.  
We interpret increases in ρ as quality creation; any action by the designer or a government 
that increases the size of the designer’s effective market will in turn have a quality creation 
effect. Not surprisingly, the elasticity of product quality with respect to market size depends 








, so the more convex design costs 
are, the more elastic quality is to market size. 
 
 
3.2 Stage One: Emigration 
 
We assume zero relocation costs. Since the designer earns more when M is larger, she 
will move to wherever her residency confers the largest global base market.  For τ<1, whether 
M
S<M
R depends only on relative populations and base profits.  Assuming the designer stays 
home when indifferent, we obtain the following lemma. 
 





If both countries have the same individual inverse demand curves (for example 
because their per capita income levels and tastes are the same), Lemma 1 implies that the 
designer optimally locates herself in the country with the largest population for any non-zero 
level of translation costs.  Of course, the designer might optimally choose a country with 
smaller population if its consumers were sufficiently richer than the other country.   
 
The designer relocates only if Recipient’s market is larger than Source’s.  Once 
immersed in the Recipient market, the designer responds to the increased returns on her 
investment, producing a higher quality prototype.   
 
Proposition 1: Voluntary emigration induces quality creation. 
 
Proof:  





S.  Since dρ/dM > 0 then ρ(M
R) > ρ(M
S) and so emigration leads to 
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4. Beneficial Brain Drain 
 
We now turn our attention to conditions under which brain drain is beneficial to the 
parties involved.  In order to minimize the number of cases that must be described, we restrict 
our attention in the remainder of the paper to cases in which the designer will emigrate if 
allowed, i.e. in which X
R > X
S.   
 
A simple revealed preference argument confirms that the designer benefits from 
voluntary migration.  Whether consumers gain depends on the rate of quality creation versus 
translation costs.   
 
Lemma 2: Consumers in country i are better off when the designer voluntarily emigrates if 
and only if  











i measure consumer surplus in country i when the designer resides 
in country j, where  
i i q i q q p dq q p
i
) ( ) (
0 − ≡ Φ ∫  
is “base” consumer surplus per capita, i.e. consumer surplus associated with quality-
unadjusted goods, when q
i units are sold per capita in country i.  As N
i and Φ
i are independent 
of ρ, CS
iS<CS
iR if and only if (2).■ 
  
Proposition 2: Recipient consumers gain from voluntary migration. 
 
Proof: For i=R, ρ(M
R) > τρ(M
S) is guaranteed by τ < 1 and Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 2 confirms that the designer’s emigration unambiguously benefits 
consumers in the Recipient country. Firstly, they benefit from the quality creation stemming 
from the designer accessing a larger market.  Secondly, migration induces quality diversion: 
the designer’s work now caters more to the tastes of Recipient consumers and less to Source’s 
consumers. 
 
Quality creation benefits Source’s consumers while quality diversion hurts them.   
Evaluating (2) for Source’s consumers puts this tradeoff in mathematical terms: Source’s 




dominates the rate of quality diversion, 1-τ. 
 
Proposition 3:  There exists  such that the designer’s emigration benefits Source’s 
consumers for τ  if and only if the Source market is sufficiently small compared to 
Recipient’s and design costs are sufficiently elastic, i.e.   
_
τ ) 1 , 0 ( ∈












;        (3) 
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if instead (3) is violated then Brain Drain is harmful to Source’s consumers for any τ<1. 
 
Proof:  
Define   as the value of τ  at which the difference between the rates of quality 
creation and diversion,  
_











M M ]       ( 4 )  
 























 is negative when evaluated at τ=1.  Using 
ρ(M
j)=ξ M
jΨ and defining α≡X
S/X
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Differentiating with respect to τ and evaluating at τ=1 gives 
()()






























, which is negative only when (3) 
holds. ■ 
 
Corollary: If (3) holds then there exists a non-empty interval of translation rates, τ, 
under which voluntary emigration raises the welfare of the migrant as well as 
consumers in both countries.
9
 
Figure 1 depicts the creation-diversion trade off from the perspective of Source 
consumers.  At the extremes, when translation losses are complete (i.e. τ=0), quality creation 
is irrelevant to Source’s consumers since none of it survives translation.  At the other 
extreme, if τ is instead unity, any additional quality creation would be perfectly useful to 
Source’s consumers; however, because M
S and M
R would be identical, emigration would 
leave ρ unchanged.  But, if τ has an intermediate value, then voluntary emigration prompts 
additional investment and some of that quality improvement survives translation.  If τ is not 
too small, the net value of the designer’s product will rise for Source’s consumers, rendering 
brain drain beneficial.
10   
                                                 
9 Our model implicitly assumes the migrant has monopoly power.  In a more general setting migrants’ residency 
and investment choices would impact competing suppliers, as in, for example, a differentiated goods framework.  
The impact of quality creation and diversion on competing suppliers in the Recipient market would be 
straightforward: increased competition from immigrants would hurt them.  Competitors remaining behind in 
Source may also be hurt.  If τρ
R>ρ
S then, even though the Source market is supplied by fewer residents, 
emigration would nevertheless raise effective supply to the Source market, hurting (non-migrating) Source 
producers as well. 
10 We characterize q as a final good and the beneficiaries of knowledge creation as consumers. However 
reframing q as an intermediate input, one which unskilled migrants employ to raise their own productivity, 
would be straightforward. Aside from accounting for feedback effects on unskilled wages (accompanying the 
     8
 
 








= rate of knowledge creation






Figure 1:  knowledge creation versus knowledge diversion  
 








is a necessary condition for BBD.  Recalling (2), Ψ>1 equates to requiring quality be elastic 
with respect to market size: since quality creation is the only channel through with brain drain 
helps Source consumers in our model, quality creation must be sufficiently responsive to 
rewards in order for brain drain to be beneficial.  
 
Secondly, because ρ is increasing in M, the larger the difference between M
R and M
S 
the greater the quality creation effect accompanying emigration. Accordingly, the larger the 
gap between X
R and X
S for a given τ, the more likely Source is to gain from brain drain.  The 
following proposition formalizes this result.  
Proposition 4.   The interval of survival rates ( ,1) over which Brain Drain is beneficial to 
Source’s consumers is larger when Source’s effective market size X
_
τ
S is small relative to 
Recipient’s, X





















































.  Thus an increase in α shifts the 




                                                                                                                                                        
increase in effective labor supply) our results generalize easily, suggesting skilled worker migration will benefit 
non-skilled migrants if intermediate goods improve in quality enough to compensate for the loss in relevance. 
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In short, relative size matters.  The smaller the Source country is relative to the recipient 
economy, the larger the range of translation costs at which brain drain is mutually beneficial.  
This suggests that brain drain is more likely to beneficial to small countries than to medium 
sized countries: if a country’s native market is large enough to induce some investment—but 
not large enough to drown out the siren call of large consumer markets like the U.S.—brain 





5.1 Endogenous IPRs 
 
Market size is critical in our model: differences in effective market size drive brains to 
migrate and are ultimately responsible for quality creation. Some of the factors determining 
effective market size, e.g. the size and income level of the native population—the latter being 
a determinant of base demand—, are outside the control of policymakers, at least in the short 
run.  However, since the goods in question can be reproduced at zero or low cost (see below), 
then π
S also depends on de jure and de facto rules governing intellectual property rights 
(IPRs).  
 
Strong IPRs provide incentives for innovation, with benefits for anyone who 
ultimately consumes or uses the innovation. IPRs are costly though; they grant patent holders 
market power, generally inducing deadweight loss.
11  Brain drain affects the innovation-
distribution tradeoff for a Source country.  Strengthening Source’s IPRs raises π
S and so 
expands the designer’s effective market regardless of where she actually lives and works 
(provided τ>0). However, the rate at which her market expands is residency dependent: if the 
designer emigrates, strong Source IPRs contribute only τ as much to the designer’s 
innovation incentives than if she had stayed home.  In contrast, the costs for Source are the 
same: stricter Source IPRs translate to higher prices for Source consumers.  Consequently, we 
anticipate that Source countries will set weaker policies when their exits are open rather than 
closed.
  12  This simple observation raises obvious concerns about endogeneity in empirical 
tests of the link between intellectual property rights and factor migration: do weak IPRs in 
small, developing countries drive human capital abroad, or are they the instead the result?
13  
 
5.2 Positive reproduction costs 
 
In our baseline model we assume zero reproduction costs. It is straightforward to 
show that introducing a constant per-unit reproduction cost b leaves our results unchanged. 









                                                 
11 Grossman and Lai (2004) analyze many of the factors influencing IPR choice in an international context; they 
do not consider emigration. 
12 Kuhn and McAusland (2006) offer a mathematical version of these arguments and also show that BBD is even 
more likely when Source’s IPRs are endogenous. By weakening IPRs Source can raise base consumer surplus, 
allowing Source’s consumers to reap a greater share of the benefits from quality creation.   
13 Our thanks to an anonymous referee for this observation. 
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b]q and effective market size is  .  Aside from the change in symbols, the 
remainder of the analysis in sections 3 and 4 proceeds as before. We note that, since   is 
decreasing in b, higher reproduction costs erode effective market size, with obvious 
implications for incentives to invest in quality. 
__ __




5.3 Endogenous reproduction costs 
 
Product quality is only one output from research and development; skilled labor is 
also used to design more cost efficient production processes.   In this subsection we briefly 
address whether brain drain might benefit Source consumers when the investment choice 
concerns expending resources so as to lower marginal reproduction costs (rather than to 
improve quality).  For simplicity, in what follows we treat quality ρ as exogenous and assume 
the demand functions are identical across countries: p(·)=p*(·).  Let d(b) denote investment 
costs necessary to achieve marginal reproduction cost b; assume d is positive, decreasing, and 
convex.  Per capita base profits will be π(b)= maxq[p(q)-b]q; denote the brain’s total profits 




Rπ(b) - d(b).   
 
We assume the second order conditions for an interior maximum hold; the brain’s 






R is the size of the relevance-
adjusted population when the brain resides in country j. Since π and d are each independent of 
population size and residency, by the envelope theorem 
 
[] ) ( ' sgn sgn sgn b
A dA
db












i<0, an increase in effective population, A, induces the brain to invest in lowering 
reproduction costs.  The Brain will emigrate only if A
R>A
S,
14 thus brain drain has a cost-
reducing effect.  Moreover, because some of this cost reduction will be passed along to 
consumers, emigration indirectly lowers base prices and raises base consumer surplus. 
Whether Source consumers are better off is ambiguous.  Although base consumer surplus 
rises, brain drain still diverts quality away from Source consumers.  Which dominates—lower 
costs versus less relevant products— depends on how elastic the function d is, how much 
larger Recipient is compared to Source, and how much relevance survives translation.   
 
In sum, the effects of migration on brains’ investments in reducing replication costs, 
and correspondingly on both home and host country consumers, are conceptually quite 
similar to the effects of migration on investments to improve product quality.  What is critical 
in both cases is the “public” nature of these investments, emphasized by Rosen both in the 
context of entertainment (1981) and management of firms (1982):  in our formulation, both a 
better product design, and a cheaper method of producing copies of a given design, apply to 
all copies of a good that are produced.   It is this feature that comprises what to our 
knowledge is a new and potentially important channel via which skilled worker migration 
may affect the welfare of remaining residents in the sending country.   
 
                                                 
14 Since we have assumed π
R=π
S in this subsection, voluntary migration requires N
R>N
S. 




It is often claimed that a large and increasing share of global economic activity 
involves the production and exchange of “knowledge goods”, defined as goods whose quality 
per unit is determined by an input of highly skilled labor, but which can be copied at zero or 
low marginal cost.  In the late twentieth century, the production of such goods was highly 
concentrated in a single country with a large domestic market (in most cases the United 
States).
15  In addition, a significant share of these goods was produced by immigrants to that 
country.
16  While the exodus of talented “brains” to larger, richer economies is sometimes 
bemoaned in sending countries, this paper shows that, under quite general conditions, the 
above pattern could be in the interests of the migrating brains, the remaining residents of the 
nations that send them, and consumers in the host country.  The remaining residents benefit 
because “their” brains produce products of higher quality (such as more effective medicines, 
more entertaining movies, or more powerful software) abroad than if they had remained at 
home.   
 
Some noteworthy features of our model include the following.  First, beneficial brain 
drain “BBD” is possible even when (a) the sending country places no welfare weight on the 
utility of its expatriates, (b) goods are less culturally relevant to the source market when 
produced abroad, that is, when demands exhibit home bias, or “translation loss”, and (c) both 
sending and receiving countries fully protect brains’ intellectual property rights in a national 
treatment framework.  Second, while we acknowledge that agglomeration economies may be 
important in explaining the location of many industries (e.g. Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991) 
such external economies are absent from our model.  Instead, international specialization—
via the migration of “knowledge” producers to a single country—can result simply from 
differences in domestic market size and home bias in tastes.   
 
  Third, the level of home bias in consumers’ tastes has interesting effects in our model.  
If we think of our parameter τ (the fraction of a good’s value that survives export to another 
country) as rising over time due to declines in international transportation and 
communications costs, then our model predicts that source countries’ benefits from brain 
drain will be minimal when international communication is poor, and will then rise as the 
ability of product designers in one country to serve consumers in another rises.  It is only in 
the limiting case of zero ‘home bias’ (τ  = 1)—where ‘brains’ can serve the world’s 
consumers equally well from any location— that better international communication 
eliminates the gains to consumers in a small or poor country from sending their brains abroad.   
 
                                                 
15 Using purchasing power parity measures of R&D activity, Dougherty et al (2003) find that expenditures in the 
US exceeded the combined expenditures of the next four leading research nations, Germany, Japan, France and 
UK.  In 2000, 34.3% of Triadic Patent Families (defined by the OECD as “patents taken out at the European 
Patent Office (EPO), the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) and the US Patent & Trademark Office ( USPTO) that 
share one or more priorities”) were taken out by American residents.  The comparable proportions for residents 
of Japan and the EU are 26.9 and 31.4 (Source: OECD, Patent Database, September 2004.)  The international 
predominance of the United States as a source of commercial popular culture is well known.  
16 In addition to entertainers, this of course includes scientists and engineers working in U.S. firms and 
universities.  Nearly one in five scientists and engineers in the United States is an immigrant; 51 percent of US 
doctorates in engineering are currently awarded to foreigners (Zakaria 2005).   
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  Fourth, while our baseline model assumes zero reproduction costs, our results do not 
require this. Moreover, we argue that brain drain may benefit consumers in the sending 
country when reproduction costs are endogenous, even when quality is exogenous. If 
migrating brains use their talents to reduce reproduction costs instead, source countries may 
gain from brain drain through lower base prices. In fact, in our framework, design 
investments by expatriate brains of the “process innovation” type (those that reduce marginal 
reproduction costs) operate in much the same way as design decisions affecting the product’s 
appeal to consumers; the key is that innovations created by brains affect all copies of the 
goods they are involved in producing, whether by raising quality or reducing unit cost.    
 
Finally, our results have implications for policies affecting “brain drain” in small or 
poor countries that have not, to our knowledge, been noted before.  For example, skilled-
emigrant-sending countries may want to refine their policies (or at least their discussion of 
brain drain) by distinguishing emigrants according to the types of goods they produce.  Thus, 
for example, our model would not apply to the emigration of a physician who spends all of 
her time treating patients; while she is skilled she produces a purely private good rather than a 
prototype that can be replicated at low marginal cost.  Thus her emigration may be more 
likely to hurt the remaining residents of her country than the emigration of a physician 
primarily engaged in research on new treatments and medicines (whether improving their 
quality or reducing their marginal reproduction costs), to which our analysis does apply.   
 
  In sum, this paper shows that brain drain may benefit the remaining residents of a 
country by improving the quality of the goods they consume, or the cost (and therefore price) 
of replicating a unit of the goods they consume.   To the best of our knowledge, this effect has 
not yet been noted in the economics literature.  We hope the present paper encourages others 
to explore additional feedback effects of international migration on consumers in both the 
sending and receiving countries.  
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